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STEVEN L. SCHOONER
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The true US death toll in Iraq and Afghanistan recently reached the 6,000threshold. But that is not what the media are reporting and as a result, the
public remains generally unaware. At the end of July 2008, mainstream me-
dia reported that 4,673 service members have died in Operations Iraqi Free-
dom and Enduring Freedom. Counting only military fatalities, however,
understates the human cost of America’s engagements in these regions by
nearly a fourth. On the modern, outsourced battlefield, contractors are sus-
taining injuries and fatalities in increasing numbers. Specifically, the losses
chronicled in The Washington Post’s ongoing “Faces of the Fallen” series1
fail to recognize the little-known fact that, as of 30 June 2008, more than
1,350 civilian contractor personnel had died in Iraq and Afghanistan in sup-
port of US military and political operations. Another 29,000 contractors have
been injured; more than 8,300 seriously.2 Yet contractor fatalities (and inju-
ries) remain generally outside the public’s consciousness.3
Given the extent of the military’s reliance upon contractors in the
combat zones, a combined number of fatalities that exceeds 6,000 is a more
accurate tally of the fallen. Apprising the American public of the human cost
associated with military operations is critically important. This is especially
true as the United States prepares for a post-election transition; transparency
will inform discussions regarding the extent to which Americans are willing
to outsource in fulfillment of the government’s mandate, at home and abroad.
Why Count Contractors?
The total number of casualties is important, because the public and
Congress not only care deeply about these fatalities, they routinely rely on
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body count as a measure of success or failure. President George W. Bush’s 31
July 2008 statement highlighted the perceived importance of fatalities and
the potential for obfuscation. The President trumpeted that “[v]iolence is
down to its lowest level since the spring of 2004,” apparently relying solely
upon military casualties as the significant measure of the violence.4
Meanwhile, neither the American public nor Congress fully grasp
the extent of the military’s reliance upon contractors in the combat zones. In
2006 and 2007 the contractor death rate climbed dramatically in Iraq. At least
301 civilian contractors died there in 2006. During 2007, some 353 contrac-
tors died in Iraq, compared with 901 US military personnel. In other words, in
2007, contractors accounted for more than one in four deaths associated with
ongoing operations. In the second quarter of 2008, at least 61 additional con-
tractor employees died in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Government Account-
ability Office recently reported that contractor deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan
during fiscal year 2007 and the first half of 2008 were a minimum of 455.5
This result should not be surprising. Today, the heavily outsourced US
military cannot effectively function or sustain itself without an enormous con-
tractor presence. Particularly in Iraq, the US government employs—directly and
through subcontracts—more contractors than military. Most experts agree that
there are at least 190,000, and as many as 196,000, contractor personnel in Iraq,
compared to fewer than 170,000 military personnel. In Iraq and Afghanistan,
contractors provide a variety of support, including food, transportation, postal,
sanitation, housing, and morale, welfare, and recreation services. They also
gather intelligence, maintain weapons, train troops, and handle interrogations.
The Comptroller General observed that “there are more private security contrac-
tors in Iraq today than the total number of contractors [of any type] (about 9,200)
that were deployed to support military operations in the 1991 Gulf War.”6
Military doctrine increasingly reflects the nearly unlimited scope of
contractor integration. In describing “contractors as a force-multiplier,”
Army Field Manual 3-100.21 explains:
[C]ontractor support . . . should be understood . . . [as] more than just logistics;
it spans the spectrum of combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS)
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functions . . . [and] traditional goods and services support, but may include in-
terpreter, communications, infrastructure, and other non-logistic-related sup-
port. It also has applicability to the full range of Army operations, to include
offense, defense, stability, and support within all types of military actions from
small-scale contingencies to major theater of wars.7
While a massive contractor presence and a near-total dependence
upon contractors in the Middle East increasingly reflect normal business for
the government in the post-millennial era, the enormity of change from his-
torical norms is still largely unknown. The Congressional Budget Office ex-
plained that “the ratio of about one contractor employee for every member of
the US armed forces in the Iraq theater is at least 2.5 times higher than that ra-
tio during any other major US conflict, although it is roughly comparable
with the ratio during operations in the Balkans in the 1990s.”8
At the same time, Congress and executive leadership mull whether
the government has become too dependent upon contractors. On 10 July, De-
fense Secretary Robert M. Gates asked the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff: “[W]hy have we come to rely on private contractors to provide combat or
combat-related security training for our forces? . . . [A]re we comfortable with
this practice and do we fully understand the implications in terms of quality, re-
sponsiveness, and sustainability?”9 We are still waiting on the answer.
While they represent a relatively small portion of the contractor pop-
ulation, private security contractors have received the most media and con-
gressional attention. The industry has mushroomed with a disconcerting
number of private contractors on the ground in Iraq, many of whom are
armed. In describing the modern-era “soldiers for hire” phenomenon, analyst
Peter Singer explained that “the wholesale outsourcing of US military ser-
vices since the 1990s is unprecedented.”10
On 30 July, Senators John Kerry (D-Mass.) and Bob Casey, Jr.
(D-Pa.) wrote to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice: “Blackwater’s deci-
sion [to move away from private security contracting] highlights longstand-
ing concerns about the wisdom of relying so heavily on security contractors
to perform overseas personnel protection missions.” The letter highlighted
the statement of Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Secretary of State for Manage-
ment, that “[i]f the contractors were removed, we would have to leave Iraq.”11
Accordingly, the Senators asked whether:
State prepared any other risk mitigation plans in the event . . . private security
contractors are unable or unwilling to fulfill their contracts? . . . As the
[United States] reduces its troop presence in Iraq, do you anticipate increased
military resources . . . to provide for the security of diplomatic personnel . . . or
do you anticipate this . . . responsibility will continue to fall to private security
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contractors? [. . . What] line . . . divides permissible conduct by private secu-
rity contractors from their performance of “inherently governmental” func-
tions? How have recent negative incidents in Iraq and Afghanistan informed
your views . . . on this subject?
These are important questions. But they remain too far removed
from the public’s view to meaningfully inform their opinions.
Outsourcing: Policy or Triage?
As the military and, for that matter, the government, struggle to de-
termine the appropriate limits for outsourcing missions, it is disconcerting
that the public does not know the extent to which contractors have made the
ultimate sacrifice. Equally troubling is how often it seems that, when pre-
sented with the facts, many simply do not seem to care. In groups ranging
from graduate students to senior leaders and officials, few appear to consider
the deaths of contractors relevant or significant.
It is not just that these groups appear not to be overly concerned re-
garding contractor fatalities. Rather, it seems that they are not able to place a
real value on contractors’contribution to the overall mission. When asked why,
some individuals mention the high salaries contractors earn. Others explain
that contractor employees have the option of quitting and going home, while
soldiers cannot. Conversely, many concede that they perceive contractor per-
sonnel, particularly in Iraq, as expendable profiteers, adventure-seekers, cow-
boys, or rogue elements, not entitled to the same respect or value due the
military.
If one accepts the assertion that an element of truth underlies most
stereotypes, then we should expect that there are miscreants amongst the le-
gions of contractors the government employs in Iraq and Afghanistan. But the
majority of these contractors are performing tasks that, only a generation ago,
would have been performed by uniformed service members. A significant
number of these contractors are former military personnel who believe they
are answering the same call had the crisis arisen when they were on active
duty.
These perceptions only add to the broader outsourcing debate,
rooted in the sustained, unplanned, and unchecked privatization of military
and support functions in an era of downsized government. As the Brookings
Institution’s Paul Light explained in The True Size of Government, despite a
generation of bipartisan efforts to portray a small government to the public,
government mandates continue to increase, leaving agencies no choice but to
increasingly rely upon contractors to provide mission-critical services.12 Fed-
eral procurement spending has nearly doubled from $219 billion in 2000 to
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more than $436 billion in 2007. It is not just that goods and services cost
more; the government is purchasing significantly more, with the most dra-
matic growth being in services contracting (as opposed to military hardware
or construction). In the last decade, the cumulative rate of increase in federal
procurement spending has been approximately five times the rate of inflation.
As a result of policies spanning both the Clinton and Bush adminis-
trations, the government has no other short-term option but to rely on contrac-
tors for the diverse array of tasks that it lacks personnel, resources, and
expertise to perform. Defense experts recognize that without contractors, the
US military simply cannot project its superiority abroad.
A number of highly publicized incidents—whether it be the prisoner
abuse at Abu Ghraib,13 the shooting of civilians by a private military company
(Blackwater USA), or the alleged cost control failings of the Army’s massive
logistics contractor, Kellogg, Brown, and Root (KBR)—all raise fundamental
questions related to the tasking of contractors and oversight of their perfor-
mance.14 A litany of criticism—from Congress, the media, and the public—
calls for a larger government footprint, an expanded military, or more agency
oversight. Such an approach idolizes, or at the least expresses respect for, both
the ethos of public service and public servants in general. This criticism re-
flects rising support for keeping public functions in the public realm. At the
same time, it reflects the citizenry’s unease with contractors playing such a
high-profile role in the projection of American power. People are finding it
troubling that contractors appear to be both visible and invisible—and all too
often, insufficiently accountable.
Why then has outsourcing become the norm? Advocates assert that
for-profit organizations are more than capable of performing a majority of
the government’s work and, if properly motivated and managed, can outper-
form government employees in terms of quality of service and price. The
private sector’s exposure to market forces, and the related corporate objec-
tive of pursuing profit, permits (and arguably requires) a more diverse array
of employee incentives. These tools include various forms of compensation
(e.g., attractive salaries and increases, bonuses, stock incentives, etc.); op-
portunity for advancement; and, of course, the risk of termination. The gov-
ernment can employ similar tools, but a heavily constrained personnel
system, coupled with de facto tenure, dilutes effectiveness. Ultimately, the
private sector enjoys the flexibility to offer greater economic rewards and
more credible sanctions. While various agencies and branches of govern-
ment aspire to reform the civil service system, doing so remains a daunting
task.
Outsourcing permits organizations to focus on what they do best,
while relying on more efficient entities to provide the goods, services, and
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support necessary. It makes sense for the government to seek experience, in-
novation, and capacity from the private sector. The civil side of the American
business community and industry possesses nearly unlimited surge capacity,
flexibility, and innovation. Additionally, they offer the ability to meet gov-
ernment agency needs using far fewer government personnel and resources.
Indeed, a number of the benefits of outsourcing—particularly in terms of de-
livery speed, quality of service, and customer satisfaction—have been dem-
onstrated by the US Army’s global use of the Logistics Civil Augmentation
Program, recognizable through its primary contractor, KBR.
Contractors offer the government the ability to supplement limited
resources far more quickly, efficiently, and effectively than the use of existing
federal employees or acquisition regimes will permit. The government can
call on contractor personnel in the event of war or natural disaster, without
maintaining excess manpower on the payroll. This is especially advanta-
geous when viewed in terms of the long-term responsibilities inherent in re-
tirement and healthcare. Whether in Baghdad or New Orleans, contractors
offer speed and geographic flexibility when deploying expertise.
Privatizing may also offer greater flexibility in terms of technol-
ogy, talent, and differing approaches than those found in the traditional gov-
ernment workforce. In an era of downsizing, contractors are capable of
providing what government may lack—skill, expertise, and innovation.
Contractors are a critical resource for government agencies and depart-
ments struggling to fulfill their missions with reduced resources. By assum-
ing ancillary responsibilities, contractors enable agency staff to focus on
core responsibilities, typically described as increasing the military services’
“tooth to tail ratio.”
In Iraq, contractors also are capable of providing consistency, expe-
rience, and institutional knowledge. The turnover of government personnel is
a constant. The military, for example, is under pressure to shorten tours of
duty, from 15 to 12 months. Civil servants, meanwhile, frequently served for
periods as short as four to six months. Even though contractor personnel will
rotate in and out of theater on a semi-regular basis, the large number who re-
main for extended periods provide valuable dividends.
High Risk Outsourcing
For all its potential advantages, outsourcing is complicated and, ac-
cordingly, risky, both from a business and a public policy viewpoint. Any orga-
nization may face a number of challenges if it relies extensively on external
resources. Government outsourcing requires detailed planning and competent
management, as organizations deal with complex policy questions and risks.15
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At the basic level, reliance on contractors often begs the question of what tasks
or functions of government should be “inherently governmental.”16
Legislators and policymakers long have applied controls to a regime
in which the government or military enjoys a monopoly on the use of force,
but at the same time the legal regime continues to struggle with guiding be-
havior and accountability. Americans have become increasingly comfortable
with “rent-a-cops” patrolling shopping malls, schools, and sporting venues,
yet they recoil at the sight of armed contractors guarding ambassadors, mem-
bers of Congress, and government officials abroad. While Iraqis may have
mixed feelings about having American soldiers in their cities, the highly visi-
ble and aggressive personal security contractors are anathema, evoking
nearly unanimous condemnation. Private security contractors aggressively
driving large sport utility vehicles and piloting helicopters personify what the
Iraqis most despise about the American presence. Security contractors also
tend to polarize opinion at home. “[Blackwater’s] Little Birds [helicopters]
can symbolize all that’s right or wrong with the war. To the enemy, they are an
evil to be struck from the sky. To an ally in trouble, their inbound buzz is the
blessed sound of a second chance.”17
What’s remarkable is how little progress has been made since 2004,
when Peter Singer wrote with regard to oversight and employment of contrac-
tors:
This expansion [in the use of private military contractors] arose not out of a
well-planned strategy, but from a process . . . best . . . described as ad hoc. The
public and Congress remain largely unaware, and the senior military leadership
is in denial about the size and scope of such firms, but many in the military’s ju-
nior and field ranks have begun to ask questions about what such outsourcing
will mean in the long term . . . . [T]he professional war college system ha[s]
asked: How does such outsourcing so many of its core tasks affect the health of
the military institution? Does dependence on the marketplace bring new vul-
nerabilities in war zones? . . . Is the military even equipped to be a busi-
ness-savvy client and an efficient regulator?18
At every level, the integration of contractors into the battle space
poses a challenge. In addition to maintaining a cohesive organizational culture
and instilling shared values across a “blended workforce,” difficulties arise in
the planning, funding, negotiating, managing, and overseeing of contracts. At
a minimum, government planning is required to reinforce an understanding of
the objective and tasks that the contractor is to provide. To successfully plan for
such outcomes, the government should maintain a sufficiently educated, expe-
rienced, and motivated acquisition cadre. Unfortunately, today’s procurement
officials are often overworked and undersupported.19 As a result, this critical
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planning function is extremely limited or, at times, simply delegated to con-
tractors.
To succeed, privatization requires selecting qualified contractors in
an expeditious manner, negotiating cost-effective agreements, and drafting
precise contracts that contain effective incentives and profit mechanisms.
Failure to meet any of these standards impacts the very nature of the govern-
ment’s delegation. Increasingly, agencies have become so dependent upon
contractors that they lack the independent ability to solve problems or evalu-
ate the solutions proposed by outside contractor organizations.20
Once contracts are awarded, the government needs to maintain the
ability to successfully manage relationships, while providing the appropriate
level of oversight if it is to ensure the best value for its money. At best, poorly
managed outsourcing dramatically reduces the likelihood of the best return
on the taxpayers’ investment. At worst, it renders the public’s expenditures
susceptible to inefficiency, waste, fraud, and abuse.21
DOD’s primary challenges have been to provide effective management and
oversight, including failure to follow planning guidance, an inadequate num-
ber of contract oversight personnel, failure to systematically capture and dis-
tribute lessons learned, and a lack of comprehensive training for military
commanders and contract oversight personnel. These challenges have led to
negative operational and monetary impacts at deployed locations.22
Congress continues to flounder in its efforts to hold contractors
accountable for crimes or torts committed abroad. This has proven particu-
larly problematic with regard to the private security firms. The military
commander’s influence over these security contractors is diluted primarily
because contractual relationships fail to mirror the chain of command. Addi-
tionally, many private security firms do not work directly for the Department
of Defense. For example, a number of these firms work for the State Depart-
ment, not to mention the number of firms that are subcontractors in the battle
area. “The type of client most common among [private security] companies is
actually other private companies[.]”23
Congress has attempted to close some of the existing loopholes
with legislative initiatives, such as the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Act (MEJA), amendments to MEJA, and expansion of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ).24 At the same time, the military departments, the
Department of State, and the Justice Department have generated a recent in-
fusion of audit, investigative, and prosecutorial resources and procedures.
While these steps are necessary, they may be too late to deter, let alone
avoid, the isolated, scandal-inducing, instances of contractor misbehavior
and corruption.
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Undercounting: Opacity or Obfuscation?
It is critical that any new administration critically analyze the extent
of government reliance upon contractors and its impact of the accompanying
policies on the battlefield and at home. While contractor deaths are a single
metric, they should play a prominent role in calculating the cost/benefit-ratio
associated with outsourcing. This again brings us back to the fact that the
number of contractor deaths—1,354 and counting—is largely understated.
The Defense Department does not publicly report contractor fatali-
ties. Indeed, the Government Accountability Office recently reported that:
DOD, State, and USAID were unable to provide complete or specific informa-
tion on the number of contractor personnel who had been killed or wounded in
Iraq or Afghanistan . . . . [T]hat information . . . was not systematically main-
tained or tracked in a manner that would allow agencies to provide us reliable or
complete data.25
Rather, the US Labor Department generates the data quarterly, but
only makes it available through Freedom of Information Act requests. The
Labor Department’s involvement derives from standard government contract
clauses, the Defense Base Act, and the War Hazards Compensation Act,
which make contractor employees eligible for worker’s compensation bene-
fits pursuant to the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act.26
These benefits apply when a contractor or subcontractor employee dies, sus-
tains injuries, or is captured while working outside the continental United
States. Contractors are required to provide Defense Base Act insurance,
which falls under this program. The Labor Department’s data reflects insur-
ance claims filed with its Division of Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Com-
pensation. As the Labor Department concedes, if a contractor’s family or
employer fails to seek compensation, that death is not included.
Unfortunately, the Labor Department’s statistics do not organize
deaths by function or nationality, so the public is unable to discern what ser-
vices these contractors provided or how many were actually Americans. It is
safe to assume that many of the victims are Iraqis and other foreign nationals
working under US government contracts. At a macro level, the Congressional
Budget Office estimated that “just under 40 percent of [the 190,000 contrac-
tors working on US-funded contracts in the Iraq theater] are citizens of the
country where the work is being performed (primarily Iraq); about 20 percent
are US citizens.”27 But those numbers may not correlate to the Labor Depart-
ment’s fatality and injury statistics. It seems reasonable to assume that Amer-
ican contractor employees and their families are more aware of the benefits
regime, and better equipped to file claims.28
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Whether those who perish are American citizens or not, they are per-
forming functions previously accomplished by soldiers. It is disingenuous to
dispute the premise that, were the US military less dependent upon contractors,
these fatalities likely would have been military. Not surprisingly, the larger
companies have experienced the heaviest losses. For example, more than 135
of L3-Titan employees (or subcontractor employees) have died in Iraq. At least
122 of KBR’s oft-maligned employees (or subcontractor employees) have
died. KBR reports that, through July 2008, in addition to 87 “hostile fatalities,”
its employees suffered 22 vehicular fatalities, 13 workplace fatalities, and ap-
proximately 850 “hostile injuries” in the Middle East.29 More than two dozen
firms have reported the loss of eight or more employees (or subcontractor em-
ployees).30 In any event, there is little doubt that the allied death toll, when con-
tractors are included, is significantly higher than previously reported.
Unpleasant Choices
Despite the topic’s importance, it is no surprise that the public did
not hear presidential candidates debating the nuances of government out-
sourcing, the privatization of the battle area, or the wisdom of a policy that led
to more than 1,350 contractor deaths. For the American public, the topic re-
mains obscure.
The root cause for the utilization of contractors lies in the imbal-
ance between military manpower reductions and current national security
policies. “Since 1991, the use of the private sector has allowed the United
States to downsize its military from 2.1 million to 1.4 million while si-
multaneously expanding its national commitments and influence abroad.”31
Accordingly, three obvious courses of action appear viable: (1) The govern-
ment could reduce its military commitments, (2) it could expand the size of
the military, or (3) it can continue to rely upon contractors. Advocacy favor-
ing the withdrawal of American forces from Iraq rarely begins with concern
for the government’s limited military resources (although analysts increas-
ingly fret that the Army is stretched too thin). While criticism of contractors
remains a popular practice, many in positions of authority have not aggres-
sively articulated the need for a significantly larger armed force and the
accompanying growth in government employment required to meet the na-
tion’s commitments. Nor have the presidential candidates prepared the
American public for what to expect if their government is to dramatically re-
duce services. Candidates certainly cannot advocate for mandatory public
service, let alone a draft. As a result, the prospect for “hollowing out” of the
military and federal government—in terms of personnel and expertise—
continues apace.
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This dilemma presents Americans with a critical issue involving the
separation of power between the legislative and executive branches. The
Constitution grants to Congress the power “[t]o raise and support Armies . . .
[t]o provide and maintain a Navy . . . [t]o make Rules for the Government and
regulation of the land and naval Forces . . . .”32 Yet increased reliance upon
contractors has permitted the executive branch to expand the size of the oper-
ational force, despite existing personnel caps. Even if Congress appears un-
willing or unable to curtail this practice, what could be more important than
answering the fundamental question: to what extent is the federal government
willing to delegate its power, as a sovereign authority, to the private sector?33
Democracy Requires Transparency
That question is exactly why publicly acknowledging contractor fa-
talities is so critical. In an election year, the citizenry of a nation is expected to
express its support or opposition to government policy. Citizens form their
opinion based on the best information available in terms of the dollars spent,
number of forces deployed, and casualties sustained—and weigh these
against the perceived benefits of military action.
When attempting to quantify the cost of the conflicts in Iraq and Af-
ghanistan,34 most Americans’ perception of military success or failure derives
from two statistics: the number of forces deployed and how many are killed or
wounded. The government’s reliance on contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan has
artificially reduced both numbers. Of all the measures of military success in
these combat zones, the number of troop fatalities resonates most strongly with
the public. These casualty figures are the public’s proxy for the human “cost” of
a military engagement, the value that an individual’s service and sacrifice pro-
vided to the nation. Yet the figure remains obscured by a lack of readily available
information related to contractor casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Since [World War II], western public opinion has shown an increasing unwill-
ingness to accept the costs of conflict, especially the death and personal loss
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“These casualty figures are the public’s proxy for
the human “cost” of a military engagement, the
value that an individual’s service and sacrifice
provided to the nation.”
which war entails . . . often referred to as “Vietnam syndrome,” or its updated
variant “Mogadishu syndrome”. . . . Aegis chief executive Tim Spicer has ac-
knowledged: “The impact of casualties is much more significant if they’re sov-
ereign forces as opposed to contractors.”35
It is unrealistic to expect the American people to understand the nu-
ances associated with the military’s personnel system, strength analysis, and
forecasting; nor should the public be expected to be overly concerned, at a
micro-level, with the management of civilian military personnel. The current
level of contractor presence permits the administration to suggest to the pub-
lic that the requirement of US forces is in actuality much smaller than what it
actually is. President Bush recently announced plans to reduce, by 8,000, the
number of forces in Iraq, or less than ten percent of the troops in theater.36 No
mention was made as to whether contractor staffing would proportionally de-
cline, remain at current levels or, as Senators Kerry and Casey anticipate, ex-
pand to fill a void created by the withdrawal.
The number of contractor casualties suggest that the reported human
cost of our efforts in Iraq—when combined with military casualties—is artifi-
cially low. Thus, an accurate tally is critical to any discussion of the costs and
benefits of the military’s efforts in these theaters. The public needs to be cogni-
zant of the fact that their government has increasingly delegated to the private
sector the responsibility to stand in harm’s way and, if required, die for America.
The media’s failure to bring contractor deaths more clearly into the
public consciousness is inexcusable. Generations of Americans have been ex-
posed to the harsh realities of armed combat by stark images of flag-draped cof-
fins arriving at military mortuaries. That, however, is not true today with
contractors. “Hiding these images [military and contractor] from the public—
or, worse, failing even to record these respectful moments—deprives all Amer-
icans of the opportunity to recognize their contribution to our democracy, and
hinders policymakers and historians in the future from making informed judg-
ments about public opinion and war.”37
Recently Congress began to require the Pentagon, State Depart-
ment, and Agency for International Development to track how many contrac-
tors are working in Iraq and Afghanistan, along with the number killed and
wounded.38 In a representative democracy, public awareness of the human
cost of our nation’s security and foreign policies is critical. If the United
States is going to continue tallying the human cost associated with military
operations then the American public deserves a full accounting.
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